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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
]<;Irnl<~~TINE B. HARRISON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
.JACK ~1. HARRISON, 
Defendant a11d Appella.nt. 
Case No. 
11370 
Respondent's Brief on Appeal 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
'l'hi8 was an action by plaintiff to alter and amend 
the prnYisions of a Divorce Decree. The motion of plain-
tiff was based upon a fraud committed by defendant 
upon the Uonrt, or in the alternative, was based upon a 
sub::;tautial change of circumstances of the parties since 
the time of the diYorce (R-98). In addition, plaintiff 
~oug-ht judgment for arrearages under the original De-
('J'Pt> (R-104). In addition, plaintiff had caused to be is-
~m'(l a Writ of Garnishment upon Valley Bank & Trust 
( 'onqiany under an existing judgment (R-109). Defend-
ant elaimcd that the garnishment was improper because 
it had been levied against partnership funds; this mat-
1(•1· \\'H8 abo before the Court and disposed of at the 
l1t«1 ring. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO-WER COUR'l' 
The case was tried on June 19, 1968, in the DiRtriet 
Court of Salt Lake County before the Honorable J osei1l! 
G. Jeppson, District Judge. The Court found that de-
fendant had misrepresented his income at the time nf 
the original divorce hearing in December of 1966; had 
concealed a certain bank account in the sum of Nine 
Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Nine Dollars And 
No/100 ($9,729.00); was delinquent under the Decree: 
and that the garnishment against Valley Bank & Trust 
Company was proper (R-114). The following relief \ms 
granted to plaintiff: 
(a) Child support was increased from Three 
Hundred Dollars ($300.00) to Four Hundred 
Dollars ($400.00) per month. 
(b) Alimony was increased from Seventy-Fiw 
Dollars ($75.00) per month to Five Hunclrerl 
Dollars ($500.00) per month. 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
An equity in a home at 1670 Merribee Wa.1-, 
Salt Lake City, which had previously been 
awarded one-half to the defendant was 
awarded to plaintiff .. 
Plaintiff was awarded judgment for Four 
Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Four Dollars 
And 50/100 ($4,864.50) together with inter-
est, representing one-half of the concealed 
bank account. 
Plaintiff was awarded judgment for Three 
Hundred, Seventy-Five Dollars ($3/fi.OO) 
representing unpaid alimony and child sup-
port for the month of June, 1968. 
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(f) Plaintiff was awarded Four Hundred Twenty 
Dollars ($420.00) representing the unpaid 
amount of an obligation at American Savings 
& Loan Association which defendant had been 
ordered to pay under the terms of the orig-
inal Decree. 
(g) Plaintiff was awarded One Thousand Dollars 
($1,000.00) attorney's fees plus costs. 
(h) Defendant was ordered to pay to Kenneth 
Rigtrup, plaintiff's former attorney, any 
amounts earned in the divorce case in excess 
of the amount previously awarded. No defi-
nite amount was awarded, however, and this 
·was left for determination by the Court in 
the future. 
( i) 'l111e Court found that there was a balance of 
One Thousand Seventy-Five Dollars ($1,-
075.00) plus costs of the prior action due 
plaintiff under a prior judgment; determined 
that the Writ of Garnishment against Valley 
Bank & Trust Company was proper; and 
awarded a garnishee judgment against Valley 
Bank & Trust Company for the Eleven Hun-
dred Seventy Two Dollars And 40/100 ($1,-
172.40), being the amount due. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks that the judgment of the trial court 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, in his brief, has made a lengthy state-
ment of facts but has omitted to mention the numerous 
facts and evidence which support the findings and judg-
3 
ment of the trial court. For this reason, plaintiff dP.~iri·.• 
to make her own statement of those facts relevant to (J 11, 
appeal. 
Plaintiff and defendant were married J nne 26, rn:ii 
(R-67) and divorced on March 10, 1967, (R-80). 'rlirn· 
were five ( 5) children born as issue of the marriBgp 
(R-67). The original divorce hearing was heard in R 
contested hearing before the Honorable Aldon J. Andl't- 1 
son on November 22, 1966, and after several continu-
ances, was heard to conclusion on December 13, 196G 
(R-66). At the conclusion of the divorce trial, the Court 
found that the defendant had treated plaintiff eruell)·, 
causing her great mental and physical strain and emo-
tional distress, particularly by reason of his association 
with one, Lorraine Woodland (R-67). The Court thcll 
granted plaintiff a divorce, granted plaintiff alimony ot 
Seventy-Five Dollars ($75.00) per month, granted plain-
tiff child support of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) 
per month, provided for visitation of the childrrn, aml 
made a division and distribution of the property of tlw 
parties (R-75). The particular finding upon which the 
provisions of the Decree relating to alimony, ebild sup-
port and property distribution were based is :F'in<ling 
No. 6 (R-68) which provides as follows: 
"Defendant is self-employed, being a partner in 
Jack M. Harrison & Associates, a data processing 
and accounting systems business, and has a ml 
income of approximately Six Hundred Dollnr' 
( $600.00) per month.'' 
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lt is thl' above finding that plaintiff attacks in this pro-
c1·rcli11g as being entirely untrue and being based upon 
tl1e concealment and the false and fraudulent testimony 
11f the clcfendant. The defendant, Jack M. Harrison, ac-
knowleclgcd that he had testified in the divorce trial 
c1mcerning his income, and that he did not think there 
11as auy other testimony at the trial concerning his in-
come other than his own (R-155). 
Plaintiff demonstrated in this proceeding by clear 
and c011\'incing evidence that the Jack M. Harrison & 
/u;;sociates alleged partnership was not a bona fide part-
1wrship at all, but had been set up prior to the divorce 
haring as a device to conceal income. Plaintiff further 
clemonstra ted that defendant's income was greatly in ex-
cess of the amount represented to the Court and, further, 
that it has substantially increased since the time of the 
trial. 
A. Facts Demonstrating the Fra·udulent N afore of the 
Partnership 
Rvidence produced by the plaintiff to show the 
framlulent nature of the partnership was as follows: 
1. The partnership agreement was executed at ap-
pr"ximately the same time as the divorce action. The 
l'P<·ord 011 appeal does not show the original divorce 
( 'i!mplaint; however, the Amended Complaint was filed 
,June ~. 1966, (R-6). The partnership agreement was 
made Oll April 15, 1966 (Exhibit P-2). 
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2. Prior to the formation of the partnership, tlie 
defendant operated the same business at the same loca. 
tion as an individual proprietorship (R-158). He had 
been in business at the same location for about three and 
one-half years prior to the date of trial (R-158). 
3. The defendant testified that at the time of the 
divorce trial, the partners in the business were himself, 
his stepfather, Hoyt Pope, and his brother, Dwayne Har-
rison (R-156); that at the time of the hearing herein, 
the partners were himself, his mother and his stepfather 
(R-156). 
4. The defendant further testified that Dwayue 
Harrison never made any capital contributions to the 
partnership (R-161). Also, his stepfather, Hoyt Pope, 
never made any capital contributions, except that Yery 
recently, he made a capital contribution of Two Thou-
sand Dollars ($2,000.00) and then withdrew Three Thou-
sand Dollars ($3,000.00) (R-159, 161). 
5. The only person who made capital contributions 
to the partnership was the defendant. These contrilrn-
tions consisted of all of the physical assets, accounts re-
ceivable, and accounts payable of his existing business. 
Thereafter, the business continued doing business in the 
same manner as it had before (R-158). 
6. The defendant's stepfather, Hoyt Pope, whom he 
claims to be a partner, is a resident of Longmont, Colo-
rado, and has never resided in Utah since the partnership 
was formed. The partnership has done no business in 
Colorado (R-159). 
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7. 'rhe defendant's stepfather, Hoyt Pope, is a 
ii c·lcler by trade. He has no background in data proces-
si11g. He has not graduated from high school (R-297). 
8. Dwayne Harrison, whom the defendant claimed 
to be a partner at the time of the divorce hearing, never 
rn::Hle any capital contributions to the partnership 
(R-161). The defendant did not recognize Dwayne as 
being a partner at the time of the hearing to amend the 
Dreree (R-162, 218). Dwayne worked in the business 
during the year 1967, but has since been replaced by a 
Fiw Hundred Dollar ($500.00) per month female em-
ployee ( H.-255). 
9. In June of 1967, the defendant made an applica-
tion to Valley Bank & Trust Company for a loan to :fi-
nance the construction of a commercial building. On the 
Ir.au application, he listed himself as "owner" of Jack 
~I. Harrison Associates (Exhibit P-12). On this exhibit, 
he also listed himself as being the applicant for the loan. 
The defendant further acknowledged in his testimony 
that the information on the application was correct 
(R-210). 
10. The defendant was requested to furnish a Profit 
and Loss Statement for the year 1966 at the time he 
made an application for the loan at Valley Bank & Trust 
Company. Such a statement was furnished, and the 
~ame showed the net income from Harrison & Associates 
for the year 1966 to be Eighteen Thousand Seventy-Six 
f>ol!ani And 67 /100 ($18,076.67) (Exhibit P-10). This 
1.·xad amount of Eighteen Thousand Seventy-Six Dollars 
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And 67/100 ($18,076.67) was shown on the defenda 11r, 
1966 personal tax return as income received from part. 
nerships (Exhibit P-11). A partnership tax return ,1·a~ 
filed for 1966 showing a partnership income of flp1·ei1 
Thousand Sixty-Three Dollars And 04/100 ($7,063.0-±) 
(Exhibit P-23). This does not include the salary paid 
to the defendant. The entire profit from the partnership 
was shown on Schedule K of the partnership return to 
have been taken by the defendant. The other partnrn 
as listed did not receive credit for any of the partnernhip 
income. The tax returns for the year 1966 were prepRrrd 
and dated prior to the time plaintiff filed her action to 
alter and amend the Divorce Decree. 
11. Tax returns for the year 1967 were prepared 
by the defendants after this action was filed and after 
depositions were taken herein (Exhibits P-3 and P-4: 
R-168). In the partnership return, almost all of the 
ordinary income was credited to the defendant's step-
father. The entire amount credited to him, howcvrr, has 
remained undistributed (R-199). 
12. Almost all of the defendant's personal expense> 
are charged to the partnership and charged off as a lm'-
iness expense. Facts demonstrating this in detail arr 
set forth and documented beginning at page 12, supra. 
13. The defendant's former attorney, John Elwood 
Dennett, was called by plaintiff as a witness in the ea 11 ~ 
and testified as to conversations he had with the <le-
fendant following the time he lm;t his license to practice 
law. In these conversations, Jack Harrison stated tlrnl 
8 
]w Jiatl a "paper partnership" and that it was set up 
i11 the mitk1h~ of a divorce action because, "I didn't want 
ltL'l' to he ahlc• to get into my assets." (R-271, 272). He 
iurtl1er testifie<1 that the defendant said the partnership 
[;d1·r <1r,·t>lopc<1 into a real partnership between himself 
n11d D1\l1yn0, hut that his stepfather, :\Ir. Pope, was al-
1nt.' s n pa1ier partner from the time the partnership was 
nL'<tl('d (H-272). 
14. j\l r. Byron Stnhhs, an attorney at law and mem-
lin of tile Utah State Bar, testified concerning conversa-
lion.s that took place at a meeting ·which he attended 
;111d 1rhil'h took place on February 12, 1968. T\Ir. Stubbs 
1ras repn•sc'nting Dwayne Harrison at the meeting. Pres-
f'llt at th<• meeting were Jack Harrison, his stepfather, 
~fr. Pope, !tis mother and Jerry Hansen, attorney at law, 
il'Jll'rse11ting .Tack Harrison (R-287). 1\Ir. Stubbs testi-
li1"<1 that .Tack Harrison told him in substance that 
Jh, a~·11p !tad no interest in the partnership (R-287). 
Jack further atkised him as follows: 
"Jack informed me that the partnership, which 
l >wayne furnished me \\·ith a copy of the partner-
ship agre0ment, was merely a paper partnership, 
and :\Ir. Pope indicated to me that it was a paper 
partiwrship; in response to a question, I asked 
l1im if he c•ver had put $2,000.00 into the partner-
·"'lii p; he indicated, no, he had not, and the only 
otlH'r -- the real interest in the conversation was 
that Jack told me that Dwayne had been in some 
t rouhle in Dc1wer, and that .Jack had bailed him 
on t, a ncl e1·e11 had to pay Dwayne's way to Salt 
Like City to heconw an employee." (R-288) 
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15. The defendant testified that he has no personal 
checking account and that all of his personal expense, 
are handled on a company check (R-194). 
16. The defendant further testified that he is the 
only person authorized to sign company checks (R-163). 
The so-called partnership bank account is set up in the 
name of ''Jack Harrison doing business as Harrison & 
Associates" (R-257). 
B. Facts Demonstrating the Income of the Defcnrlant 
There was some conflicting evidence concerning the 
income of the defendant. The evidence consisted as fol-
lows: 
The defendant's loan application to Valley Bank & 
Trust Company filed in June of 1967 stated his income 
to be Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($18,000.00) per year 
(Exhibit P-12). 
The Profit and Loss Statement for the year 1966 
furnished to Valley Bank & Trust Company showed an 
income of Eighteen Thousand Seventy-Six Dollars Anrl 
67 /100 ($18,076.67) (Exhibit P-10). 
The defendant claimed on his 1966 personal tax re-
turn, income from partnerships in the amount of Eigl1t-
een Thousand Seventy-Six Dollars And 67 /100 ($18,-
076.67) (Exhibit P-11). This return shows a claimed loss 
from the sale of stock which the def end ant testified wa~ 
disallowed by the Internal Revenue Service. 
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A Profit and Loss Statement furnished by the defen-
dant to Valley Bank & Trust Company for the period, 
,January 1, 1967, through May 31, 1967, showed a net 
profit of Twenty One Thousand Six Hundred Eighty One 
Dollars And 88/100 ($21,681.88) for that period of time 
(~Jxhibit P-9). 
The defendant testified that the income from the 
hnsiness for the year 1967 was either Thirty Six Thou-
sand Dollars ($36,000.00) or Thirty Five Thousand Dol-
larn ($35,000.00) (R-168, 207). 
The defendant told John Elwood Dennett, his former 
attorney, that he had a gross income in 1966 of over 
~1orty Five Thousand Dollars ($45,000.00) and that he 
was able to net two-thirds of the gross as net income 
for the year 1966 (R-266). He further told Dennett that 
l11s ~roRs for 1967 was Ninety Six Thousand Dollars 
(~96,000.00) and that his expenses were a lesser per-
l'entage than the year before (R-268). He stated that his 
net for 1967 would be just a little under Seventy Thou-
sand Dollars ($70,000.00) and asked Mr. Dennett to sug-
gP8t ways of escaping taxes (R-268). The defendant 
fnrther stated that he expected to double his income in 
19G8, although this statement was made at a time after 
c·ertain hostilities had developed (R-269). 
l~ven if the Court were to entirely disregard the 
btimony of Mr. Dennett and accept the statement of 
lli(• cldendant that the income from the partnership for 
1~!1)/ was Thirty Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00), 
111P PYi<lPnce clearly demonstrates that such figure is a 
11 
starting point only. The Thirty Five Thousand Dol!m.' 
($35,000.00) was arrived at by taking the net profit fur 
1967 as shown on the tax return and adding the paymPnt~ 
to partners (R-207). However, in arriving at tlw uet 
profit, there were numerous items claimed as busiuess 
expense which actually represented personal expendi-
tures of the defendant. An example of these are a' 
follows: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
The defendant admitted that all of the n1l-
vertising and promotion expense ·was rontecl 
through his pocket. All of the checks clrnrgeil 
to advertising and promotion were made p~ir 
able to Valley Bank & Trust Company; tlie 
procedure was for the defendant to cash these 
checks and then use the cash as he sa11- fit. 
This amounted to the sum of Seventeen Hun-
dred Thirty Three Dollars ( $1,733.00) in 196i 
(R-173). 
All of the defendant's gas and oil expendi-
tures are charged off as a business expense. 
The business owned a 1962 Cadillac, a cam1wr 
and a 1956 Chevrolet. The automobiles wm 
operated by the defendant, although the 19ii6 
Chevrolet was not used last year. 'l'he 1lc-
fendant considered these auto~obiles as bus-
iness cars· these expenses amounted to Four-
' l teen Hundred Nineteen Dollars AnJ 54/lOU 
($1,419.54) in 1967. (R-174; also Exhibit P-fl, 
page 2). 
All repairs to the automobiles are charged H' 
a business expense. These expenses amount-
ed to Six Hundred Forty One Dollars Antl 
14/100 ($641.14) in 1967. (R-175; also Ex-
hibit P-6, pagP 2). 
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(d) Insurance, including all of the defendant's 
car insurance is charged as business expense. 
'l'his amounted to Seven Hundred Sixty 
Three Dollars And 93/100 ($763.93) in 1967. 
(R-176; also Exhibit P-6, page 3). 
( e) A substantial portion of the rent on the de-
fendant's personal apartment was charged 
as a business expense. The amount so ex-
pensed was Seven Hundred Twenty Dollars 
($720.00) in 1967. (R-177; also Exhibit P-6, 
page 4, note entries showing checks payable 
to Twin Palms Apartments). 
(f) The defendant testified that a portion of his 
power and telephone bills were charged as 
business expense (R-80). Exhibit P-6 is a 
general ledger for the business for the year 
1967. Account No. 950 was the defendant, 
Jack M. Harrison's personal drawing ac-
count. The defendant testified that the por-
tion of his utilities charged to him person-
ally should appear under Account No. 950 
(R-181). An examination of Account No. 950 
shows no payments to any utility companies 
(Exhibit P-6, page 14). Thus all of the de-
fendant's utilities were charged to the com-
pany as a business expense, although it can-
not be determined from the ledger the exact 
amount attributable to defendant personally 
(Exhibit P-6, page 10). 
(g) Account No. 274 (Exhibit P-6, page 7) which 
is contract labor (R-178) shows payments of 
Seven Hundred Seventy Four Dollars And 
50 /100 ( $77 4.50) to Lorraine Woodland. 
This is the same Lorraine Woodland ref erred 
to in the Findings of Fact of the original 
divorce action as being the person with whom 
defendant ~was keeping company (R-179). 
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(h) During the year 1967, the company purclrnH.,
1 
the truck and camper from Hincklcr\; at 8 
cost of Four Thousand Sc\-en Hundred Did. 
la rs ( $4,700.00). This was purchas<:>d witli 
company funds and is being depreciateJ a' 
a b~siness expense. The defendant claim, 
that this was purchased as a delivery truck, 
although the camper is permanently mou11tc·rl 
and has never been off the truck. Also, tlwri· 
is no sign on the truck indicating it to lw a 
company truck, and the only items ev<:>r tie. 
livered anywhere are paper supplies. (R-183 
to 185, 205). 
The above all represent items which plaintiff was 
able to uncover in the hearing. There are numerou~ 
items in the general ledger posted in such accounts a~ 
"Cost of Goods Sold,'' "Labor,'' and "Contract Labor" 
which plaintiff had no way of determining whether they 
are legitimate. 
In addition to the a hove, there are other indication' 
from the evidence that the income from the business i' 
more than was admitted by the defendant. Dming the 
year 1967, the business paid approximately Thirty Fiw 
Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00) in cash tmvarcls a new 
building. This amount \Vas in addition to the Twenty 
Seven Thousand Dollars ($27,000.00) borrowed from 
Valley Bank & Trust Company. The cost of the hnilding-
was Fifty Three Thousand Dollars ($53,000.00) (R.-204). 
This did not include the land cost of Four Thousand F'ire 
Hundred Dollars ( $4,500.00) ( R-204). The net amount 
disbursed by Valley Bank & Trust Company under the 
loan was Twenty Four Thousand Six Hundred Fort:· 
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Tlm•o Dollars And 27/100 ($24,643.27) (R-211). There 
\\l'I'e 110 other loans made to finance the building (R-213). 
:\o additional amounts are owing (R-215). The loan at 
Ynllry Bank & Trust Company is being paid off over a 
ten (10) year period of time and is not delinquent (R-210, 
313 ). The building was constructed during the summer 
of 1 D67 ( R-205). The building has been appraised at 
Sixty T>vo Thousand Dollars ($62,000.00) (R-215). 
In addition to the large cash payments made on the 
l1nilding during 1967, the defendant made loans during 
1967 of almost Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) (R-181; 
also Exhihit P-6, page 11). One of the entries shows a 
loan to Lorraine Woodland, his girlfriend, in the amount 
of Two Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($2,-
~50.00). 
('. Facts Demonstrating That the Income of Defendant 
lias not dropped in 1968 
rrhe defendant testified generally that his income 
1rns down and his expenses were up for the year 1968. 
:\o records were produced for the year 1968, and the de-
frnuant testified that none were available (R-215, 216). 
'l'he plaintiff called an officer of Valley Bank & Trust 
l'ompany to testify concerning the gross bank deposits 
in tlir company's checking account for 1968. The records 
from the bank indicated that the deposits from January 
l 1hrnu~h May of 1968 were Forty Nine Thousand 
Thi rty-Ij'our Dollars And 93 /100 ( $49,034.93). This is 
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more than one-half of what defendant ackno-wleclged to 
be his gross receipts in 1967 ($96,116.39; R-164), vet 
covers a period of only five ( 5) months. 
The defendant also told his former attorney, Jlr. 
Dennett, that he expected to double the business in 1%8 
(R-270). 
D. Facts Demonstrating That the Def end ant Concea/erl 
a Bank Account at the Time of the Original Dirorr1 
Action 
Plaintiff introduced evidence showing the manipula-
tion of various savings accounts at J\Iurray First Thrift 
& Loan Company. Exhibit P-15 shows an account arnl 
ledger sheet sho-wing a savings account in the name of 
Jack l\L Harrison in the amount of Three Thousarnl 
Ninety Four Dollars And 19 /100 ( $3,094.19). This en-
tire account was withdrawn on August 18, 1966. 'fhis 
was three months prior to the time the trial was held in 
the divorce case. On the same day, August 18, 1966, a 
new account was opened at ::\forray First Thrift in the 
name of Jack M. Harrison & Associates (Exhibit P-16). 
The initial deposit was Four Thousand Five Hunclrerl 
Ninety Four Dollars And 19 /100 ( $4,594.19), and other 
deposits were later added. On November 28, 1966, a 
withdrawal was posted to the ledger of this account. The 
amount of the withdrawal was Nine Thousand Seven 
Hundred Twenty Nine Dollars ($9,729.00), which ro11-
sisted of all of the money in the account. 
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The above withdrawal of Nine Thousand Seven 
Hurnlrud rrwenty Nine Dollars ($9,729.00) was com-
parl'cl to a new account in the name of Keith C. 
Hawkes which was opened at J\Iurray First Thrift on 
\'rwembcr 22, 1966 (Exhibit P-18). The date that the 
KL'ith C. IIa·wkes account was opened was the very day 
ilwt the Ji,Torce trial started. The amount of the initial 
1kposit in the Keith C. Hawkes account correlated ex-
artly to the amount withdrawn from the account of Jack 
~l. Harrison & Associates which was Nine Thousand 
Sen'n Hundred Twenty Nine Dollars ($9,729.00). 
On .July 3, 1967, after the divorce trial was over, the 
Keith Hawkes account was closed with a withdrawal of 
Tcn Thousand Fifty Two Dollars And 32/100 ($10,-
05~.~2) (Exhibit P-18). There had been no additional 
Jeposib; to this account other than interest entries. 
In the meantime, another account had been opened 
al :\forray First Thrift in the name of Harrison & Asso-
eiatrs (11~xhiLit P-17). On the very day that Keith 
Ha\Ykes closed his account (July 3, 1967), a deposit was 
made to the Harrison & Associates account in the amount 
of 'I'm Thousand One Hundred Twenty One Dollars And 
91/100 ($10,121.91). 
KPith C. Hawkes was called as a witness by the 
plaiHtiff. He admitted that he had received the money 
froru .J a Pk Harrison, but claimed it was a loan to pur-
d1ast> a restaurant in Jackson, Wyoming (R-187). He 
stalc,d that the money was never withdrawn from Mur-
ray First 'fhrift because the restaurant deal fell through 
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(R-188). There was no written instrument or note ewr 
made up, and the note was strictly oral (R-189). No in. 
terest was ever paid other than the interest that had ac. 
crued at Murray First Thrift (R-190). 
The plaintiff, Mrs. Harrison, testified that she had 
no knowledge of the account of Jack M. Harrison & As. 
sociates in the amount of Nine Thousand Seven Hundred 
Twenty Nine Dollars ($9,729.00) that existed on the day 
the divorce trial commenced. (R-282). She did not learn 
of this account until "yesterday." R-182). 
The Findings of Fact in the original divorce actio11 
listed in detail all of the assets of the parties. The find-
ings refer to family savings of Sixteen Hundred Dollars 
(R-68) of which plaintiff was awarded the sum of Eight 
Hundred Dollars ($800.00) (R-71, 78). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT WERE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
Plaintiff's Motion to Alter and Amend the Judgment 
was made on the ground of fraud committed upon the 
Court, or in the alternative, upon a substantial change 
of circumstances. The trial court made a finding of both 
fraud and change of circumstances (R-115). The eYi· 
dence supports both findings, either of which would sup· 
port the judgment of the trial court. 
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As to the change of circumstances, the evidence of 
1Mendant 's income in 1967 and 1968 as set forth in detail 
in the statement of facts herein clearly shows that he is 
making substantially more than the Six Hundred Dol-
lars ($600.00) per month which the Court found to be 
Iii~ income at the time of the original divorce action. 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code An.notated, 1953 provides that 
"subse(1uent changes or new orders may be made by the 
Court with respect to the disposal of children or the 
distribution of property as shall be reasonable and prop-
er." This Court has recently reaffirmed that under the 
ahore statute, the Court retains jurisdiction of the par-
ties to modify the decree with respect to the distribu-
tion of property, especially where the parties voluntarily 
litigate a matter over which the Court has jurisdiction. 
lMt -vs- Bott, 20 Utah 2d 329 437 P. 2d 684. The con-
trolling principle has been stated that a decree of di-
rnrce may be modified if it is alleged, proved, and the 
trial court finds that the circumstances upon which it 
ll'as based have undergone a substantial change. Gale 
-1·s- Gale, 123 Utah 277, 258 P. 2d 986; Osmus -vs- Osmu.s, 
114 Utah 216, 198 P. 2d 233. This Court has also held 
that the modification of a decree is within the latitude of 
disrretion reposed in the trial court with respect to 
which his judgment should not be interfered with unless 
thPre is shown some injustice or inequity as to indicate 
a clear abuse of that discretion. Jorgensen -vs- Jorgen-
se11, 17 Utah 2d 159, 406 P.2d 304. 
As to the fraud, the leading Utah case appears to 
hP lfonrr -rs- Haner, 13 Utah 2d 299, 373 P.2d 577. There 
liJp Court stated as follows: 
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"It is sometimes said that when a judgmc111 
is attacked collaterally on the ground that it \\'a, 
obtained by fraud or deceit it will be set asid,, 
only for extrinsic fraud. But we are in a~cord 
with the indications in the Restatement of Juck 
ments that this is too limited. It seems more r~<;I 
istic to say that when it appears that the proc-
esses of justice have been so completely thwarted 
or distorted as to persuade the court that in fair-
ness and good conscience the judgment should uot 
be permitted to stand, relief should be grantrlL 
However, inasmuch as the plaintiff here seems !11 
be relying on the ground of fraud, there is a dis-
tinction which it is necessary to point to. In order 
to justify granting relief, the alleged wroug •rnnld 
have to be of the type characterized as extrinsic 
fraud: that is, fraud based on conduct or acfo- , 
ities outside of the court proceedings themselves: 
and which is designed and has the effect of de-
priving the other party of the opportunity to pre-
sent his claim or defense. This type of fraud, 
which is regarded as a fraud not only upon the 
opponent, but upon the court itself, can be ac , 
complished in a number of ways, such as making ! 
false- statements or representations to the other 
party or to witnesses to prevent them from con-
testing the issues; or by that means or othrrwise 
preventing the attendance of the parties or wit-
nesses; or by destroying or secreting evidrnce: 
so that a fair trial of the issues is effectively pre· 
vented.'' 
The evidence here consists of the type of thing ref errerl 
to in the above language. The plaintiff proved by clcnr 
and convincing evidence that defendant had taken affir· 
mative steps before coming to court to conceal and serrete 
the evidence. He trans£ erred and concealed a subs tan 
tia1 bank account that was unknown to the plaintiff a11d 
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,et np a fraudulent partnership to conceal his income. 
These activities were in addition to defendant's per-
jured testimony regarding his income. Such actions on 
the part of defendant were designed and had the effect 
,,f <lepriYing plaintiff of the opportunity to litigate the 
issL1es in the divorce action, and a fair trial was effec-
ii\'Ply prevented. 
A. Tlie Provisions of the Amended Decree Relatin.g to 
Alimony and Support u·ere Reasonable 
The trial court awarded plaintiff Four Hundred Dol-
lars ($400.00) per month child support and Five Hun-
cheLl Dollars ($500.00) alimony. This amounted to Nine 
Hundred Dollars ($900.00) per month or Ten Thousand 
~ight Hundred Dollars ($10,800.00) per year. 
If the Court believed the statements made by the 
clefcndant, .Jack Harrison, to his former attorney that 
lie netted just under Seventy Thousand Dollars ($70,-
000.00) in 1967 and expected to double his income in 1968, 
theu the above award would be considered very nominal. 
If the Court believed that the income from the bus-
iness for 1967 was Thirty Six Thousand Dollars ($36,-
000.00) as was testified by the defendant, and further be-
lien'd from the overwhelming evidence that the partner-
ship was a sham and the entire income belonged to the 
defendant, still the award would be somewhat modest. 
21 
If the Court believed the defendant's income to hi· 
Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($18,000.00) per year as lit 
represented to Valley Bank & Trust Company, and as 
appeared on his 1966 tax return, the award would still 
be in line with what is reasonable. Especially is this true 
where, as here, it was shown that nearly all of the de-
fendant's personal needs are paid for by the com pally. 
These include bis automobile, gas and oil, repairs, in-
surance, rent on apartment, utilities, etc. These benefits 
would add the equivalent of several thousand dollar~ 
per year to the defendant's income. 
There is substantial evidence to justify the award 
of the trial court. Certainly the plaintiff and the fire 
( 5) minor children of the parties are entitled to live in 
accordance with the same standard of living as the de-
fendant, particularly where, as here, the guilt for the 
break-up of the marriage was found to have rested on 
the defendant. See Wilson -vs- Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 
P.2d 977. 
B. The Provision of the Amended Decree Awarding the 
Home to Plaintiff was Reasonable 
Under the original Decree of Divorce, it was ordered 
that the home of the parties be sold and the proceeds 
divided between them (R-77). This provision would be 
very understandable when considered in light of the find-
ings that the total income of the defendant was Six Hun-
dred Dollars ($600.00) per month. Obviously, if Six Hun· 
dred dollars ($600.00) per month had to be divided k 
tween two (2) households, the parties simply could not 
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haYe afforded to keep the house upon which the mortgage 
payments were One Hundred Seventy Dollars ($170.00) 
prr mouth. These considerations, however, no longer 
L•xist, and there is no reason to remove plaintiff and the 
1•hilrlren from their established home. 
Plaintiff testified in this action that she had resided 
at the home for five and one-half (51/2) years (R-293); 
that the children were well established in their respective 
schools (R-293) ; that the children are active in church 
(R-293); and that the children have many friends in 
the neighborhood and participate in Little League Base-
ball and other neighborhood activities (R-294). 
This Court has stated on many occasions that the 
primary concern in a divorce action should be the inter-
ests of the children. Any divorce between parents causes 
t1J a greater or lesser extent feelings of insecurity on the 
part of minor children. It is a difficult adjustment for 
tlwm to make. Plaintiff contends that unless it is abso-
lntely necessary, it would be unfair to deprive the chil-
rlren of the security they receive from their home, their 
neighborhood, their school, their church, and their 
friends. 
It was further made clear by the evidence that de-
fendant has a commercial building in which there is an 
r·quity of over Thirty Five Thousand Dollars ($35,-
000.()0). '11his is in addition to the other business assets 
of the defendant. Plaintiff has made no claim to any of 
tl1ese husiness assets, and it is only equitable and fair 
il1at slic· he awarded the home. 
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C. The Provision of the Amended Decree Awardi11v 
Plaintiff Judgment for One-Half of the Co11cealr1/ 
Bank Account was Reasonable 
The evidence as set forth in the within statement 
of facts demonstrated beyond question that the defellll-
ant concealed a bank account in the amount of Nim 
Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Nine Dollars ($!1, 
729.00). It was only fair that plaintiff be awarded one. 
half of this amount. This was also in keeping with the 
original decree which awarded one-half of the family 
savings of Sixteen Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) to the 
plaintiff. 
D. The Provision of the Amended Decree Ordering D('. 
fendant to Pa.y to Plaintiff's Former Attorney Any 
Additional Fees Earned by Him in the Divorce Case 
was Reasonable 
During the course of the trial herein, it was brougl1t 
to the attention of the Court that plaintiff owed brr 
former attorney additional amounts for services reu· 
dered in the divorce case (R-145 to 149). The Court or 
dered that these amounts be paid by the defendant. It 
is true that plaintiff had not petitioned the Court for 
this relief. However, in the case of J or gens en -vs- Jor-
gensen, 17 Utah 2d 159, 406 P.2d 304, this Court rejected 
the contention of an appellant that the trial court had 
erred where the trial court made an increase in alimony 
when the plaintiff had not petitioned for such increase. 
The only concern seemed to be the wisdom and propriel) 
of the trial court's action. 
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In any event, this provision can be of no concern to 
the rlefcndant at this time inasmuch as no amount was 
fixe1l, an<l the matter was left to be determined in a fur-
ther hearing. (R-113). 
POINT II 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN A WARD-
JNG PLAINTIFF A GARNISHEE JUDGMENT 
ACL\JNST VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMP ANY 
Unrelated to plaintiff's Petition for Modification of 
the Dr·erce was a matter concerning an existing garnish-
ment which the Court considered at the trial. The Writ 
of Garnishment was served upon Valley Bank & Trust 
Company and the Bank answered indicating that is was 
indebted to Jack M. Harrison by reason of a checking 
account with a balance of Two Thousand One Hundred 
Dollars Aud 87 /100 ($2,100.87) (R-109). The garnish-
ment was issued against unpaid arrearages and attor-
ney's fees awarded in the original Decree of Divorce. 
There was no dispute concerning the amount owing 
rn-110, 249), the only question being whether the money 
in the checking account belonged to the defendant. As 
has been demonstrated herein and discussed at length, 
it was clearly shown from the evidence that the alleged 
parh1erRhip was nothing more than a fraudulent scheme 
to eonceal the assets of the defendant. Section 25-1-25, 
l'toh Code Anrnotated, 1953, gives a creditor the right 
to disregard a fraudulent conveyance and attach and 
lc\y <'xccution upon the property conveyed. The Court 
11as correct in awarding a garnishee judgment. 
25 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN AW ARD OF 
ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR THIS AP. 
PEAL 
The award of attorney's fees.by the trial court coy. 
ered only those services rendered to plaintiff at the trial. 
Plaintiff seeks that this court in rendering its decision 
herein affirmatively order that the trial court award 
additional attorney's fees to cover reasonable amounts 
incurred by plaintiff in connection with this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case fully supports the judg-
ment of the trial court, and there is nothing in the record 
to show any prejudice or abuse of discretion on the part 
of the trial judge. The Amended Judgment and De-
cree was fair and equitable in all respects, and there is 
no reason for this Court to interfere with the Decree. 
The trial court listened to three days of testimony and 
had all of the parties and witnesses before it. There is 
no reason to believe that the result would be any differ-
ent if a new trial were ordered. Respondent respectfully 
submits that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS, ARMSTRONG, 
RAWLINGS, WEST & 
SCHAERRER 
David E. \Vest 
1300 vValker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plain.tiff and 
Respondent 
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